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Our aim is to make an appropriate characterization and interpretation of the risk 
problem of rapid large sea level rise that reflects the very large uncertainty in 
present day knowledge concerning this possibility, and that will be useful in 
informing discussion about risk management approaches.  We consider mainly 
the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet as the source of such a sea 
level rise. Our review, characterization and interpretation of the risk makes us 
conclude that the risk of a rapid large sea level rise is characterized by 
potentially catastrophic consequences and high epistemic uncertainty; effective 
risk management must involve highly adaptive management regimes, 
vulnerability reduction, and prompt development of capabilities for 
precautionary reduction of climate change forcings.  
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1. Introduction 
In 1982, Roger Revelle, in an early assessment of the potential effects of a 
climate-induced sea-level rise, graphically sketched the potential impacts: ￿The  3
oceans would flood all existing port facilities and other low-lying coastal 
structures, extensive sections of heavily farmed and densely populated river 
deltas of the world, major portions of the states of Florida and Louisiana, and 
large areas of many of the world cities￿ (Revelle, 1982). Since that time an 
extensive literature has evolved aimed at delineating the risks of a large sea-
level rise, particularly the potential probabilities of such an event, the rate at 
which it might occur, and the types and magnitudes of associated uncertainties. 
Despite this extensive scientific effort, the nature of the risk entailed in a major 
future sea-level rise continues to be elusive and subject to conflicting expert 
opinion. The most prominent possibility for a large and relatively abrupt rise in 
sea level under consideration at present is the potential collapse of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS) and this is the focus of our review. The IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) in its Second Assessment Report 
concluded: ￿Our ignorance of the specific circumstances under which West 
Antarctica might collapse limits the ability to quantify the risk of such an event 
occurring, either in total or in part, in the next 100 to 1,000 years￿ (Warrick et al., 
1996). A recent study by the U.S. National Research Council of Abrupt Climate 
Change  also notes that: ￿large, abrupt and widespread climate changes with 
major impacts have occurred repeatedly in the past, when the earth system was 
forced across thresholds. Although abrupt climate change can occur for many 
reasons, it is conceivable that human forcing of climate change is increasing the 
probability of large, abrupt events￿ (Alley et al., 2003). 
  4
Quantitative estimates of either the likelihood of West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse over a given time period or the magnitude of the consequences of such 
a collapse are not possible at present. There is also little chance that credible 
estimates will be available for a considerable time. There is, however, a 
considerable amount of scientific information that requires interpretation, and 
there are many public policy and management issues that deserve attention. 
Accordingly, some sort of risk analysis, even an analysis lacking the specificity 
one normally expects in a risk assessment, is needed. We might use a more 
general name, ￿risk interpretation￿ for such a less specific review of the state of 
scientific knowledge. Such an  interpretation would include an analysis of what 
is known about the ￿threat￿ or ￿threats￿; including the state of knowledge about 
both potential consequences and likelihoods of such consequences. It would 
also include an evaluation of management opportunities for addressing the 
threats. Of particular importance would be a discussion of the nature of the 
uncertainties about consequences, likelihoods, and opportunities for mitigation. 
The discussion would include a qualitative discussion of plausibility and would 
evaluate the extent to which quantitative probabilities can be assessed. A key 
element of the interpretation would be an assessment of the opportunities and 
likelihood of acquiring new or improved information and identifying any 
signals germane to management initiatives, together with a determination of the 
capabilities required to acquire such information or define such signals. In what 
follows, we begin such a risk interpretation. In doing so, we have a particular 
interest in a worst case situation, that is, the occurrence of a rapid sea level rise  5
of five to ten metres over the next several centuries. We proceed thematically as 
follows: (Section 2) the threat: sea level rise;  (Section 3) potential collapse of 
the West Antarctic ice sheet; (Section 4) abrupt climate change; (Section 4) 
vulnerabilities and impacts; (Section 5) what kind of risk problem is this?; 
(Section 6) implications for risk management.   
 
 
2. The threat: sea-level rise 
A number of phenomena contribute to future sea-level rise, including the 
thermal expansion of the oceans, a loss of mass of glaciers and ice caps, a loss 
of mass of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets due to recent and projected 
climate change and ongoing adjustment to past climate change, and runoff from 
a thawing of permafrost and deposition of sediment on the ocean floor (Church et 
al., 2001 p. 682). On the basis of these contributions the IPCC has estimated an 
average global sea-level rise of 0.09 -0.88m with a central value of 0.48m, for a 
range of Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation  Models (AOGCMs) and 
emission scenarios (from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios), in 
the period 1990-2100 (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and 
Woodworth, 2001 p. 671). It is important to note that this IPCC average and 
uncertainty range do not take into account possibilities of dynamical ice 
movement in Antarctica (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and 
Woodworth, 2001 p. 683). We return to this factor below, but initially wish to point  6
to the difference between global average sea level rise and what may occur at a 
local scale.  
 
There is considerable variability associated with location, implying that relative 
sea level changes
1  may be considerably larger or smaller than the global 
average sea level rise. A number of factors contribute to this geographical 
variability. Some relate to the behaviour of the land next to the sea.  Relative 
sea level changes is influenced for instance by tectonic land movements. 
Tectonic land movements include rapid displacements associated with 
earthquake events and slow movements such as mantle convection and 
sediment transport. Shorelines can retreat or advance in response to vertical 
land movements. Coastal subsidence in river delta regions has a typical 
magnitude of 10mm/yr (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and 
Woodworth, 2001 p.659). As an example of an upper estimate, local sea level in the 
Bangladesh delta could be 447cm higher than at present by 2100 as a result of 
enhanced subsidence (due to groundwater/petroleum withdrawal) and a 
maximum projected eustatic sea-level rise of 217 cm (Milliman et al., 1989 p. 344). 
Relative sea level changes are further influenced by isostatic movements. When 
ice sheets melt, vertical land movements occur due to the redistribution of mass 
                                                 
1 Relative sea level change is the change in mean sea level as measured by coastal tide gauges. 
Mean sea level at the coast is "the height of the sea with respect to a local land benchmark, 
averaged over a period of time, such as a month or a year, long enough that fluctuations caused 
by waves and tides are largely removed " J. A. Church et al.: 2001, Changes in Sea Level’, in 
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change J. T. Houghton et al., 
Eds. (Cambridge University Press, Cambrige, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 
2001) pp. 881..  7
within the earth and oceans. There are still such glacio-hydro-isostatic effects, 
for example, occurring from the melting of the ice sheets 6,000 years ago 
(Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 654). 
 
Relative sea level changes also depend on the distribution of global average sea 
level rise. The distribution of global average sea level rise depends on ocean 
surface fluxes, interior conditions, and circulation. (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, 
Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 644). The IPCC notes: "Our 
confidence in the regional distribution of sea level change from AOGCMs is 
low...However, models agree on the qualitative conclusion that the range of 
regional variation is substantial compared with the global average sea level rise. 
Nearly all models project greater than average rise in the Arctic Ocean and less 
than average rise in the Southern Ocean" (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, 
Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 642). Local meteorological changes and 
changes in the frequency of extreme events also influence the relative sea level 
changes in  a particular coastal region (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, 
Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 674). 
 
The impacts of a large sea level rise are still little studied, particularly as they 
involve interactions between physical and ecological change with human 
systems. Since human responses will emerge as the sea level rise occurs, both 
the rate of the rise and the adaptive capacities of impacted human systems are 
essential issues.  We need to know much more about the circumstances under  8
which the coping and adaptive capacities of human systems will be 
overwhelmed.  These will surely be highly place specific, and will interact with 
other stresses confronting these places, thereby compounding the assessment 
task. 
   
3. Potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet 
The principal current scenario for a widespread global catastrophic risk of rapid 
large sea level rise, and not just local cases of a high and rapid sea level rise, is 
the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet. The West Antarctic ice 
sheet is a marine ice sheet, meaning that it rests largely on ground that is well 
below sea level (although part of its mass involves floating extensions, ice 
shelves, that move seaward but are confined by the rocky coast). Release of the 
grounded ice to the ocean would contribute four to six meters of rise in global 
mean sea level.  By collapse, following Oppenheimer (1998), we mean "the 
loss of most or all of the land-based (grounded) ice on a timescale that is much 
shorter than its accumulation turnover timescale".  The West Antarctic ice sheet 
assumes central importance in that other ice sheets either are largely grounded 
above sea level, are subject to only gradual ablation from moderate warming (as 
in Greenland), or have no clear history of major, rapid ice changes in the recent 
geological past (as in East Antarctica) (Oppenheimer, 1998 p. 325).  
  9
Timescale is a crucial factor with respect to estimates of potential West 
Antarctic ice sheet contributions to sea level rise. Three questions are involved: 
When will the West Antarctic ice sheet start to disintegrate? How long will 
such disintegration take? Will the rate of disintegration as measured in sea-level 
rise equivalent be constant or change (and if so how?) over time? Answers to 
these questions are not always clear when disintegration of the West Antarctic 
ice sheet is discussed. The following table (Table 1: Estimates of sea-level rise 
due to disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet) gives some examples of a 
number of estimates that have been made since the late 1960’s, and the forcings 
and explanations given.   
 
 
Table 1 to follow. 
 
Large uncertainty characterizes the assessment problem of West Antarctic ice 
sheet collapse. It arises from a number of different sources: incomplete 
scientific understanding of the physical phenomena and their interrelationships 
involved, incomplete data and measurements; and overly simplistic and 
unvalidated models. The complexity of the physical systems suggest the 
inherent magnitude of the assessment challenge. An expert panel was once 
convened to identify possible adverse events, system components and 
mechanisms, and causal interactions that could lead to a collapse of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002 p. 73). A number of important events  10
and mechanisms were identified, including ice shelf erosion, reduced 
thermohaline circulation, increases in precipitation, ice stream variability, 
glacial readjustment, sub-glacial eruption and surface melting. The Workshop 
sought to assess the degree of consensus through a Delphi process on the 
relative importance of the various mechanisms. But the result indicated both 
little consensus on this question and substantial disagreement as to the most 
likely pathways through the complex web of relationships. More importantly, 
the workshop pointed up a classic uncertainty problem in risk assessment-that 
of completeness. It is unclear that the complexity shown in diagrammatic form 
(Vaughan and Spouge, 2002 p. 73) has captured fully the important mechanisms at 
work and workshop members did agree that ￿the complexity of interactions is 
probably under-represented￿ (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002 p. 74). Moreover, many of 
the causal relationships are not adequately understood scientifically, such as the 
tendency of individual ice streams to switch on or off completely or to alter 
substantially their flow rates within a few decades (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002). 
This lack of scientific understanding and consensus of basic phenomena and 
their behavior and interactions constitutes one of the most serious types of 
uncertainty ￿ epistemic uncertainty ￿ which, if large, is highly likely to generate 
surprises, behavior of the system unanticipated by current models and expert 
expectations. 
 
The Delphi Panel reported on by Vaughan and Spouge (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002) 
did identify the main sources of large uncertainty emerging in the Delphi  11
exercise to estimate the possible collapse of WAIS and the list speaks to the 
pervasiveness of the substantial and often interacting types of uncertainties that 
currently exist: 
 
o  What is the current mass balance of WAIS? 
o  Will ice shelf loss cause significant increases in discharge rates of grounded ice? (This 
has been a major issue in WAIS research for decades, and is still not resolved). 
o  Will increases in precipitation resulting from global warming outweigh possible 
increases in ice discharge? 
o  Will reduced thermohaline circulation be a consequence of atmospheric warming, and 
could this would (sic) outweigh ice shelf melting that results from increased sea 
surface temperatures? 
o  What are the causes of ice stream variability, and how significant is this mechanism? 
o  What are the continuing effects of the last glacial to interglacial transition? 
o  Can substantial increases in ice stream flow be sustained long enough to cause 
collapse? 
o  Has WAIS-collapse occurred in previous inter-glacials? 
(Vaughan and Spouge, 2002 p. 84) 
 
It is quite clear that many of these uncertainties will not be removed, or perhaps 
even significantly reduced, during the near term but also that new sources of 
uncertainty are likely to emerge. 
  
One troublesome source of uncertainty in the study of the West Antarctic ice 
sheet and its possible collapse involves making spatial inferences from one part  12
of the ice sheet to another. Inferences are made when data from one part of the 
ice sheet are extrapolated to other parts of the ice sheet or when physical 
mechanisms studied in one part of the ice sheet are assumed to function as well 
in other parts of the ice sheet. Future studies of yet inadequately analysed parts 
of the ice sheet may reveal different sets of data and/or different physical 
mechanism at work than inferred by previous studies. As long as systematic 
data of the entire ice are lacking, these problems of inference will remain. 
 
Climate change introduces uncertainties to the problem of rapid large sea-level 
rise. The relationship between West Antarctic ice sheet collapse and global 
warming is itself uncertain. Furthermore, uncertainties in climate change add to 
that uncertainty, especially the possibilities for extreme or abrupt climate 
change. Climate change is problematic as a causal factor since it itself is 
surrounded with uncertainties that relate to a lack of data, a lack of scientific 
understanding of mechanisms at work, and the difficulties of making 
projections. With respect to the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet, some 
uncertainties of climate change stem from uncertainties in the future local air 
and ocean temperatures as a result of global warming. It should also be noted 
that a much greater global warming than presently estimated would open up the 
possibility of surface melting as a new disintegration mechanism (Church, 
Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 679).   
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Recent data provide mixed messages about disintegration. Recent empirical 
measurements of the behavior of the West Antarctic ice sheet has offered some 
evidence that the behavior of the West Antarctic ice sheet may not be as 
threatening or as unstable as thought earlier, at the same time as it has 
introduced new sources of risk and uncertainty. Reports have emerged that the 
ice sheet may not have thinned as much in recent years as previously thought 
(Bindschadler and Bentley, 2002). Improved measurements of the Ross ice streams 
have indicated that new snowfall is generally keeping pace with ice loss in this 
sector, suggesting almost no overall net shrinkage in process. This could be 
comforting in part. But in the past several years it has also become clear that all 
sections of the West Antarctic ice sheet are not behaving in the same way. In a 
poorly understood region adjacent to the Amundsen Sea, for example, scientists 
have discovered that glaciers are disappearing at a faster rate than hypothesized 
even for the Ross ice streams. In the Antarctic Peninsula, meanwhile, summer-
time atmosphere has been warming rapidly, threatening disintegration of ice 
shelves that have been relatively stable. Also, some reports have suggested that 
warmer ocean waters mixing from lower latitudes may be melting the ice 
sheet￿s grounded edges faster than previously assumed (Bindschadler and Bentley, 
2002).  In 2004 reports appeared on accelerated ice discharge and glacier 
acceleration and thinning following the collapse of the Larsen B ice shelf. 
Satellite remote sensing techniques has allowed direct observations of the effect 
of ice shelf removal on glacier flow. Rignot et al. conclude: "Radar 
interferometry observations of the Antarctic Peninsula suggests that its glaciers  14
accelerated dramatically in response to the collapse of Larsen B ice shelf" 
(Rignot et al., 2004 p. 2). Scambos et al.  report "Ice velocities derived from five 
Landsat 7 images acquired between January 2000 and February 2003 show a 
two-to six-fold increase in centerline speed of four glaciers flowing into the 
now-collapsed section of the Larsen B Ice Shelf" (Scambos et al., 2004 p. 1).  In 
short, the flow of new scientific measurements and analyses suggests both 
potential feedbacks previously underestimated or unidentified and new sources 
of risk uncertainty. All these assessments of course rest precariously on 
assumptions concerning uncertainty, possibilities of abrupt change, thresholds, 
and feedback mechanisms. So we next turn to these issues.  
 
Oppenheimer, in his review in Nature, concludes that: ￿It is not possible to 
place high confidence in any specific prediction about the future of WAIS￿ 
(Oppenheimer, 1998, p. 330). Assuming continued growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions according to rates characteristic of most of the IPCC ￿IS92￿ emission 
projections, he identifies three risk scenarios: 1) gradual dynamic response to 
removal of the Ross ice shelf, 2) no dynamic response, and  3) substantial (or 
rapid) dynamic response. He goes on to provide some hypothetical detail for  
each of these possibilities. 
 
Oppenheimer judges scenario 1 to be most likely (but with low confidence), 
scenarios intermediate between 1 and 2 with lower sea-level rise to be 
conceivable, and scenario 3 to be least likely. He also opines that no convincing  15
model exists for a sudden collapse that would cause a 4-6 m sea-level risk over 
the coming century, although more recent work on abrupt climate change and 
recent observations of dynamic behaviour of ice sheets might alter this view. 
One problem with Oppenheimer’s three scenarios is that they are not fully 
specific with regards to time. As discussed earlier in this paper, a time specific 
estimate of West Antarctic ice sheet collapse needs to answer when the ice 
sheet will start to disintegrate, how long it will take, and at what rates through 
the disintegration period. The first Oppenheimer scenario is not specific with 
respect to the disintegration rate for the first 200 years (it is given at 0-0.19m 
per century). As interpreted by Oppenheimer, the third scenario may imply a 
sea-level rise of 4-6m in 250 or 400 years. 
 
Estimating the likelihood of West Antarctic ice sheet collapse may also proceed 
on observations of the West Antarctic ice sheet together with mechanistic 
assumptions.  Since there is still controversy over what the mechanisms are and 
their causal relationships, this approach is ambiguous.  However, the Vaughan 
and Spouge Delphi exercise is informative in this regard. Although one may 
well question the basis of probability estimates that combine the estimates from 
experts who disagree, the exercise of having various experts confront the same 
questions and  provide their basis for estimation helps to clarify the state of 
scientific debates and the practical implications of different positions. Several 
observations may be made based on this exercise and our review of the risk 
estimation literature:  16
 
  There are many disagreements over the relative importance of various 
mechanisms, of various observations, and of the validity of 
extrapolations over time and over different regions of the ice sheet; 
  Quantitative estimates of time until collapse or significant contribution 
to sea level rise were somewhat easier to obtain than direct estimates of 
likelihood, but the findings were similar; 
  Across the group, no one asserted that collapse or significant 
contribution to sea level rise was impossible; there was considerable 
support for likelihood estimates of a few percent in a few centuries; and 
some support for likelihood estimates of a few percent for significant 
changes in the next 200 years;   
  The disagreements and difficulties in obtaining estimates of likelihood 
at the level of a few percent strongly imply that credible estimates of 
likelihood at the level of .1% are not feasible at present. Rephrasing, this 
also means that we lack a capability to rule out likelihoods that are of 
great concern for events this potentially catastrophic; 
   The discussion indicates a clear expectation among those participating 
that new research could well clarify many issues about mechanisms and 
they suggest a research agenda.  Given the complexity of the 
mechanistic picture and the overlap in current likelihood estimates from 
people with very different perspectives, such clarification may not, 
however, lead to a great improvement or increased expert consensus in  17
the likelihood estimates.  However, there is the potential for findings 
that would help mitigation efforts such as better understanding of the 
connection to greenhouse gas (GHG) induced climate change, or the 
identification of signals that could better indicate accelerated movement 
toward collapse. 
 
4. Abrupt climate change 
While there is a large and growing body of research on the ecological and 
societal impacts of climate change, virtually all of this research has relied on 
smoothly varying scenarios with slow and gradual changes and impact 
responses. This is understandable in part as analysts have wished to avoid the 
appearance of undue confidence in any single projection. Surprisingly little 
work has been done on the potential implications of abrupt climate change for 
human societies. Yet we know from climatic records that large, widespread, 
and abrupt climate changes have occurred repeatedly in the past. Paleoclimatic 
data, for example, reveal a sensitive climate system subject to large and perhaps 
difficult-to-predict abrupt changes (Alley, 2003). Large changes have occurred 
repeatedly in the past and with little net forcing. Meanwhile global circulation 
models have often underestimated the magnitude, speed, or extent of past 
changes (Alley, 2003). 
  18
The recent report by the U.S. National Research Council (U.S. National Research 
Council, 2002) on abrupt climate change points out that such change is a common 
feature of the global climate system, that such change has reached up to 10￿C in 
a decade in some regions, and that ￿available evidence suggests that abrupt 
climate changes are not only possible but likely in the future, potentially with 
large impacts on ecosystems and societies￿ (U.S. National Research Council, 2002). 
The report also documents striking examples from past experience. Initial and 
final temperature change in central Greenland, for example, reached about 15￿C 
at the end of the Younger Dryas, while the warning rate reached fully 8￿C in a 
single decade and snow accumulation doubled in only three years. A strong 
climatic change occurred about 6200 BP cooling temperatures by about 10￿C in 
the Atlantic and 2￿C in Europe. During more recent historical times, multi-
decadal droughts led to the collapse of early Mesopotamian and Egyptian 
cultures around 2200 BC and of the Mayan cultures after 750 AD (Michaelowa, 
2004 p. 378). 
 
The picture that emerges from recent writings is a climate system with 
threshold behavior involving large and rapid threshold transitions between 
multiple locally stable states. Triggers are known to exist in the climate system 
that can precipitate rapid change, and can be either fast, slow, or potentially 
chaotic. Small incremental changes can induce flips from one state to another in 
ways that can be irreversible or only slowly reversible. Amplifiers also exist 
that can produce large changes with only minimal forcing. From many past risk  19
studies dating back to the ￿rapid onset￿ natural hazards (Burton et al., 1993) we 
know that abrupt changes are heavily implicated in risk events associated with 
large damage and loss of life. This is particularly germane to the large sea-level 
rise hazard because, as noted above, abrupt changes are possible in ice sheets 
affecting sea level and ocean circulation. We have already seen above the 
difficulty in identifying and quantifying all causes of a West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse. In a review article in Science, the authors (the members of the panel of 
the above mentioned US NRC report) call attention to the same problems in 
assessing abrupt climate change, as well as the problem of lack of predictability 
near thresholds. They caution that although climate models are improving 
rapidly, they have "not yet reached the level of sophistication that will enable 
them to be used to simulate the likelihood of occurrence of the more abrupt and 
possibly spontaneous climate shifts described in this paper" (Alley, Marotzke, 
Nordhaus, Overpeck, Peteet, Pielke Jr, Pierrehumbert, Rhines, Stocker, Talley and Wallace, 
2003 p. 2009).  Meanwhile, (Alley, Marotzke, Nordhaus, Overpeck, Peteet, Pielke Jr, 
Pierrehumbert, Rhines, Stocker, Talley and Wallace, 2003) concludes that there should be 
serious consideration that future climate changes will be larger than indicated 
by the mean of the major climate-model projections and may involve abrupt 
changes not projected accurately by existing models.  
 
Wrestling with abrupt change possibilities must begin with the definition of 
￿abrupt change￿ itself. The U.S. National Research Council (U.S. National 
Research Council, 2002) study defined it thus:  20
 
technically, an abrupt climate change occurs when the climate 
system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a transition 
to a new state at a rate determined by the climate system itself 
and faster than the cause. The cause may be chaotic and thus 
undetectably small (U.S. National Research Council, 2002 p. 14)  
 
Such a definition, however, addresses only climate change as a biophysical 
phenomenon and not in its interaction with human vulnerabilities, coping, and 
adaptive behavior. Recognizing this, the report later, in its chapter on societal 
and ecological impacts, adopts a rather different definition: 
 
from the point of view of societal and ecological impacts and 
adaptations, abrupt climate change can be viewed as a 
significant change in climate relative to the accustomed or 
background climate experienced by the economic or ecological 
system being subject to the change, having sufficient impacts to 
make adaptation difficult (U.S. National Research Council, 2002)  
 
The latter definitional approach is the more useful, particularly in impact and 
decision-making terms, as it views climate change in its interactions with 
ecology and society. Ultimately it is the effects of such changes upon the well-
being of ecosystems and human populations that really matter.  21
 
These considerations have led Hulme (Hulme, 2003) to argue that neither of the 
definitions presented by the U.S. National Research Council suffice as an 
adequate conception of abrupt climate change. He contends that a more 
stringent definition is needed that takes account of three major dimensions, as 
follows: 
 
Rate. Abrupt climate change globally, occurs if the rate of 
warming is greater than ca.0.55￿C per decade, or if the rate of 
global sea-level rise is greater than ca. 10 cm per century (see 
IPCC 2001). For continental or smaller regions, the threshold 
rates at which climate change should be viewed as abrupt would 
be greater. 
 
Direction. All the IPCC scenarios entail basically unidirectional 
curves of climate change, at least at global and large region 
scales. But abrupt change scenarios could occur when the 
direction of climate change alters in a sustained manner. 
 
Severity. Two aspects are sometimes important￿the exceedance 
of certain climate thresholds and the occurrence of one or more 
extreme or unprecedented climatic or weather events. 
  22
Setting aside for the moment the particular values chosen by the IPCC or 
Hulme, this conceptual discussion, and the categories chosen, are particularly 
instructive as they begin to move the notion of ￿abruptness￿ into the domain of 
interactive human-ecological systems and highlights the importance of 
considering climate change at varying scales and taking account of the large 
spatial variability of vulnerability to characteristics of the types of change 
occurring. 
 
As yet we know little of these interactions and the limits to the abilities of 
society to cope over the short and long term. Two prominent examples from the 
past century are noteable, however, as reviewed by Hulme (Hulme, 2003). The 
Sahel region of Africa experienced a 30% reduction of precipitation between 
the 1960s and 1980s, following a period of sustained increase of precipitation 
between the 1920s and 1950s. This is a good example of major directional 
change. While the initial impacts of the drought period were severe and the 
abrupt change occurred in a region of weak institutional capacity, many 
communities turned out to be surprisingly resilient (Batterbury and Warren, 2001). 
In another case￿the central European floods of August, 2002￿several 
consequences occurred for large areas of southeastern Germany, the Czech 
republics, and Hungary, totaling many billion of euros, but also sparked efforts 
that will enhance the longer term resilience of these societies in flood 
management (Hulme, 2003). 
  23
In terms of anticipatory assessment of the societal implications of abrupt 
climate change, few studies have yet been conducted. Economists have paid 
relatively little attention to adaptation alternatives (Carraro, 2002)  in climate 
change generally, much less abrupt change. An interesting effort to address the 
impacts of abrupt climate change is available in Mastrandrea and Schneider 
(Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2001). They explore the potential importance of abrupt 
non-linear climate damages with a modeling exercise that links a single 
integrated assessment model to a simple climate-ocean model capable of 
representing the weakening or collapse of the thermohaline circulation. The 
results point out the danger and high cost of abrupt changes compared with 
those that evolve more slowly and are better foreseen, and the need to examine 
a wide range of plausible climate effects, impacts, and mitigation assumptions. 
These are issues to which we return later in this review. 
 
All this has considerable implications for future climate change research and 
impact assessment. It is worth noting in brief the research agenda called for in 
the U.S. NRC study: 
 
￿  understanding thresholds and nonlinearities in geophysical, 
ecological and economic systems (to which the authors of this paper 
emphasize the importance of extending this to social and 
institutional systems); 
￿  integrated modeling efforts to simulate abrupt climate change;  24
￿  more and better data on past abrupt climate change; 
￿  developing realistic frequency distributions of climate variables to 
allow long-term societal planning; 
￿  development of ￿non-regrets￿ adaptations strategies, especially for 
developing countries and focusing on institution building. 
 
 
5. Vulnerabilities and impacts 
 
Reflecting the more general state of vulnerability and impact analysis for 
climate change, few studies have treated in depth the potential impacts of a 
large sea-level risk. Such assessments need to identify both the potentially 
impacted systems and then the vulnerability of such systems to the projected 
sea-level risk at an associated rate of change. Ideally, such assessments should 
also take into account other social and environmental stresses likely to exist. 
The vulnerability assessment should take account of at least three major 
dimensions ￿ the degree of exposure to risk by ecological and human systems, 
their sensitivity to change, and their adaptive capacities over time. Needless to 
say, the human systems should be viewed as dynamic, instituting feasible 
mitigative and adaptive actions in the face of threat. The conceptual framework 
for coastal vulnerability assessment presented by the IPCC (McLean et al., 2001 p. 
364) attempts to address both socioeconomic and natural systems, though not in 
their coupling.    25
 
Vulnerability assessments should also analyse the differential impacts across 
social groups. For instance, in Bangladesh, land that is subject to flooding is 
disproportionately occupied by people living a marginal existence. These 
people have few options and resources for adaptation.  Assessments also need 
to analyse differential impacts across entire communities or states. Small island 
states are likely to be more seriously affected due to their high exposure and 
limited coping resources. Global vulnerability assessments have, irrespective of 
methodology, all identified the small island states as one of the highest risk 
areas. Coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass beds, fundamental to many small 
island state economies, are threatened by sea-level rise (Nurse et al., 2001).  
Assessments sensitive to comparisons with other assessments can thus capture 
potential inequities that may result from sea-level rise, as well as livelihood 
systems (such as fishing or tourism) that are at exceptionally high risk.  
 
The impacts of a complete disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet have 
yet to be explored in any depth, but the IPCC asserts that middle and high 
estimates of disintegration time scales (corresponding to a mean contribution of 
10-15 mm of sea level rise per year) lie ￿outside human experience and would 
widely exceed the adaptive capacity of most coastal structures and 
ecosystems...￿ (Smith et al., 2001 p.951), though the assumptions and basis for this 
statement are unclear.  
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A complicating issue in assessing vulnerability and impacts is the role of 
extreme events, such as storm surges and high waves. There are two (main) 
ways in which the highest sea level at a given location can change. One is 
through an increase in mean sea level with which present extreme levels will 
occur more frequently. The impacts may involve a significant increase in the 
extent of the area threatened with inundation as well as increased risk within the 
existing flood plain. The other is through alterations to the occurence of strong 
winds and low pressures, which would bring changes to storm surge heights 
(Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001). An 
example of a study looking at both sea level rise and storm surges is a study of 
Tongatapu Island by Mimura and Pelesikoti (1997) where they predicted that 
land loss would be 14% greater with a storm-surge imposed on a one metre sea 
level rise, than with simply a one metre sea-level rise (Nurse, Sem, Hay, Suarez, 
Wong, L. and Ragoonaden, 2001 p. 855). Furthermore, the IPCC notes that:  "Few 
studies have examined potential changes in prevailing ocean wave heights and 
directions and storm waves and surges as a consequence of climate change. 
Such changes can be expected to have serious impacts on natural and human-
modified coasts because they will be superimposed on a higher sea level than at 
present" (White et al., 2001 pp. 35-36). In short, it is clear that increases in the 
frequency and severity of storminess and other extreme events are an important 
consideration in vulnerability and impact assessment but have yet to receive 
significant attention. 
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The thinness of the assessment literature on vulnerabilities and the magnitude 
of potential consequences, on the dependence of the magnitude on mitigation 
efforts, and on capabilities for mitigation and adaptation is typical in the 
analysis of emerging, highly uncertain hazards.  Despite the "thinness" of 
vulnerability and impact analysis several observations may be made: 
 
  While clearly the consequences would be very large,  there is great 
uncertainty about relative vulnerabilities, consequences, and about 
the potential for mitigation and adaptation just as there is about 
likelihood of events. And, similarly, there are important 
opportunities to develop new information that can aid in managing 
the hazard; 
  A key need is to understand better the circumstances that can lead to 
the overwhelming of response capabilities and adaptive capacity; 
  Vulnerability analysis can help to identify those at especially high 
risk and the extent to which impacts can be avoided or reduced; 
  Mitigation efforts do not always work as intended, and in some 
cases may even make things worse.  Examples can be drawn from 
the classic experience in flood plain of those seeking to reduce risk 
relocating into even more hazardous locations. This is a 
phenomenon associated with the social amplification of risk and is 
particularly pertinent for a drawn out threat like sea level rise.  
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Continuing on the theme of vulnerability and the scope of vulnerability 
analysis, two observations about variability in the threat of sea level rise are of 
particular interest: 
 
  The IPCC observation that variability among locations in the 
average height of sea level rise is similar in magnitude to the IPCC 
estimated average rise across locations is significant because that is 
itself a substantial contribution to sea level rise in some locations 
even if the average rise from West Antarctic ice sheet disintegration 
is greater.  More importantly, it serves as both a contributor to local 
vulnerability in areas expected to have higher than average rise and 
as a reminder that a broad analysis of local vulnerability is needed in 
assessing the threat and opportunities for mitigation; 
  Similarly,  the average rise in sea level at a location is not the only 
indicator of impacts.  Short duration events such as storm surges 
may be very significant, and again there may be substantial local 
variability in vulnerability to such events, both because of 
differences in the likelihood of severe short duration events, and 
because of differences in capabilities for responding to them. 
 
  29
6. What kind of risk problem is this?  
Based on our review of the current state of knowledge concerning the risks of a 
large rapid sea level rise over the next several centuries, we may inquire into 
the nature of the risk in the context of other hazards of substantial human 
concern. In short, what kind of risk problem does a large sea-level rise 
represent? We have a number of initial observations, all of which are relevant to 
public policy and management considerations:  
 
  This risk does not lend itself to traditional risk assessment, with a 
spelling out of the specifics of probabilities and consequences. This 
risk is not possible to quantify, nor to characterise explicitly;  
  These risks are in a small class of low probability/catastrophic risks 
accompanied by unusually high levels of uncertainty. The potential 
size of adverse ecological and human consequences are among the 
largest threats currently facing the planet;  
  The size of the potential consequences are somewhat ameliorated 
by the fact that the accumulation of large risk will likely build over 
the course of one or many centuries, affording time for mounting 
human responses aimed at risk mitigation and adaptation; 
  Because of large epistemic uncertainties and the limited state of 
knowledge concerning abrupt changes scenarios, it is unlikely that 
the probabilities of a large rapid sea-level rise will be markedly  30
better understood in the near term (the next 5-10 years) and some 
new sources of uncertainty are likely to emerge; 
  Due to the interlinkages and complexities of the climate system, an 
assessment of the risks entailed by of a collapse of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet is not restricted to sea-level rise; 
  The assessment of ecological and human vulnerabilities has lagged 
seriously behind efforts to estimate the scientific aspects of climate 
forcing, the behavior of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the 
dynamics of ice stream flows. Large efforts will be required to 
redress this imbalance, with particular attention needed to 
enhancing our understanding of likely adaptive behavior in different 
cultures and human-environment settings, the case studies of the 
ATLANTIS project, presented in this special issue, are an important 
contribution to such assessments (see Lonsdale et al., Poumadere et 
al., Olsthoorn et al. in this special issue);   
  There are many disagreements over the relative importance of 
various mechanisms, of various observations, and of the validity of 
extrapolations over time and over different regions of the ice sheet. 
 
Turning again to the nature of the risk, some further general remarks are 
pertinent: 
 
The consequences of collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet are uncertain, but  31
potentially extremely large.  They will be very widespread.  The magnitude of 
the consequences will depend in part on details of the melting and  how high 
and rapidly sea level rises. The nature and magnitude of the consequences will 
also depend on the timing and effectiveness of mitigation efforts.  It should be 
feasible to identify areas particularly vulnerable to consequences from sea level 
rise. 
 
The likelihood of collapse is very uncertain.  There appears to be precedent in 
recent geological times (the past hundred thousand  or a million years or so) for 
such melting, so the possibility cannot be ruled out.  Furthermore we lack the 
knowledge to rule out probabilities suggesting that collapse appears a 
significant risk.  The uncertainty extends to both the likelihood of collapse and 
the potential timing of collapse (how soon it might start  and how quickly it will 
proceed to collapse). There is, at present, no scientific consensus on 
mechanisms for relatively rapid collapse or on whether such mechanisms exist. 
Also there is no agreed-upon relationship between mechanisms  for collapse to 
the temperature rises that might occur from GHG emissions.  Beyond the 
question of whether temperature rise can cause West Antarctic ice sheet 
melting, little is known about whether a temperature rise could significantly 
accelerate melting. 
 
The news from this litany of uncertainty should not be entirely discouraging. 
Much new information has appeared in the past decade and there is  32
considerable controversy over its interpretation. So it is reasonable to expect 
further findings and some clarification about their interpretation. It is likely, 
however, this process will not lead to very refined probabilities, nor will we be 
able any time soon to rule out West Antarctic ice sheet disintegration as a 
significant risk. On the other hand, there may be much useful information about 
possible signals for movement to collapse, and better estimates of the rates at 
which it might occur.   
 
Given this kind of risk problem, we see two primary implications for 
management: 
  Given the complexity of the risks and the primitive state of sea-
level rise risk assessment, it is apparent that the long-term scenario 
at stake is surprise-rich risk management. It is almost certain, given 
the current scale of knowledge, that significant future surprises will 
occur, perhaps involving major reassessment of the risks. 
Management will need to proceed from a continuing spectre of 
potentially catastrophic planetary risks and a poor base of 
understanding of probabilities and likely effects. This suggests the 
need for greater attention to strategies for reducing ecological and 
human vulnerabilities, highly adaptive management regimes geared 
to responding to new information, and strategies for precautionary 
actions and building resilience.  33
  In addition to vulnerability reduction, the prompt development of 
capabilities for precautionary reduction of climate change forcings 
is urgently needed to mitigate the long term impacts of climate 
change as well as the higher levels of uncertainties regarding the 
future behaviour of the climate system and its impacts. 
 
6.1 Risk analogues 
Before proceeding to these management considerations, we first examine 
several analogues that may help to put the risk of a rapid large sea level rise in 
broader risk context and further inform alternative management approaches that 
could be taken to such a highly uncertain but potentially catastrophic risk.  
 
Global climate change generally and the threat of West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse particularly pose a unique set of challenges for risk analysis.  
However, many aspects of these problems and a number of useful lessons can 
be found from experience with other  highly uncertain hazards for which the 
possibility of surprise is an important aspect of the threat.  Two interesting 
examples come from the nuclear fuel cycle: planning for the possibility of 
severe nuclear power plant accidents and the long term management of 
radioactive wastes.  Another set of examples come from experience coping with 
emerging and unusually virulent diseases.  A further example of interest is 
another  potential extreme event in climate change ￿ a drastic change in 
thermohaline circulation with the attendant impacts on regional climate. Each  34
of these examples has some relevant similarities to the West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse threat, and distinctive differences as well.  For each we provide a list of 
lessons that would be worth exploring in greater detail. 
 
6.1.1 Planning for the threat of a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.  
This may seem at first sight to be far fetched as an analogue. Emergency 
decisions and the corresponding responses must be made very quickly,  while 
major changes in the West Antarctic ice sheet, if they occur at all, will take 
place over decades or even centuries. However, an immediate lesson is that the 
relevant time scale is defined by the relationship between warning times and the 
time it takes to respond; any effective response to the threat of West Antarctic 
ice sheet melting is likely to take a substantial amount of time to implement.  
Thus planning for accidents serves as an analogy for considering responses to 
warnings in several respects: 1) opportunities for prevention and opportunities 
for mitigation both merit attention; 2) warnings will not necessarily leave much 
time for the necessary mitigation measures; 3) impacts will be localized and not 
very predictable; 4) planning for a variety of contingencies will thus be very 
important .  There are also, of course, important differences that limit the 
analogy:  1) nuclear accidents occur over a smaller spatial and temporal scale;  
2) the mechanisms and potential accident characteristics are better understood; 
3) there already exists a concerned citizenry and a planning infrastructure.   
Partly because the threat of nuclear accidents has received more practical study  35
and planning, there are a number of useful lessons to be drawn from the 
analogy: 
 
  Credible risk analysis proved possible and provided 
numerous benefits that went  beyond the original reasons for 
the analysis. These included guidance for reducing the 
likelihood of accidents, guidance for improving operating 
performance, insights into planning emergency response, and 
methodological development that has been used for other 
hazard analysis; 
  Mitigation efforts can increase harm as well as reduce it. The 
most dramatic possibility is for evacuation into areas of 
greater radiation exposure. One dramatic possibility is for 
evacuation into areas of greater radiation exposure or more 
exposure due to evacuation than would be afforded by 
sheltering; 
  Attention needs to be paid to the practical problems in 
implementing mitigation measures,  including the need for 
in-place resources, the ability to assess conditions as they 
evolve,  and community trust in the mitigation program. 
6.1.2 Management of radioactive wastes 
Unlike planning for nuclear plant accidents, radioactive wastes are generally  36
regarded as a long term hazard.   The reasons for considering it an analogy 
include: 1) the long time scales of concern; 2) the concern with geological 
behavior over time and, particularly, with low probability events and potential 
surprises; 3) and the lack of broad risk-based analysis.  Of course there are also 
important differences that limit the analogy: 1) the magnitude of the threat is 
much smaller and it is far more localized: 2) many of the experts believe  that 
the technical problems in  risk management can be solved.  The key lessons 
emerge from considering the implications of risk-based analysis and observing 
the  current state of radioactive waste management are: 
 
  Risk-based analysis could be used to structure management 
efforts over time so that urgent and accessible risks can be 
dealt with first without compromising preparations for longer 
term threats; 
  An appropriate infrastructure could be established that would 
organize efforts over time, would monitor implementation,  
would seek out and assess new knowledge, and would assess 
changes in future management needs; 
  These possibilities for adaptive management , however, have 
not been realized.  It seems apparent that what is widely 
agreed to be a problem extending over tens of thousands of 
years cannot be fully solved in a decade.  One critical reason  
for this failure is that there is little trust by interested parties  37
in the present authorities and infrastructure.  Adaptive 
management requires that interested parties believe that there 
is a trustworthy process available on an ongoing basis for 
assessment and for making changes in management 
arrangements over time. Management, in short, is an 
evolving experience, even experiment, and cannot be 
achieved by one-time solutions based on risk analysis and 
repository performance models.  
 
6.1.3 Planning for the threat  of emerging and unusually virulent diseases 
Again this seems to address a more imminent concern than sea-level rise 
although, interestingly, there is considerable discussion currently on links 
between climate change and changes in the appearance and spread of disease.  
There are a number of reason why such planning may  be considered an 
analogy:  1) the threat is widely distributed yet there is likely to be considerable 
local variability in the severity of impacts; 2) identifying highly vulnerable 
populations will be an important aspect for assessment; 3) development is 
needed of infrastructure that has the flexibility and capability for surveillance 
and for addressing a broad range of possibilities and that also can connect to 
strong local functionality.  Important differences that limit the analogy are: 1) 
threats can appear very rapidly; 2) surveillance must be done directly on 
humans, with the added challenges  this poses for maintaining trust, protecting  38
people￿s rights, and keeping the surveillance effective over long periods of 
time.  As with the other two examples, there is a history of management 
failures, specifically failure in adaptation,  to suggest lessons: 
 
  A particularly interesting observation is that  in the most conspicuous 
recent  failures - the emergence of HIV (AIDS), and BSE (mad cow 
disease) - the failure occurred early, but somewhat after the initial 
recognition.    There appears to be a particularly difficult time period for 
adaptation, when the perception of the threat is only emerging and there 
are strong incentives for minimizing that perception; 
  In the AIDS case, hindsight indicates that there were opportunities for a 
much more vigorous protection of the blood supply and for a much 
more serious effort to contain the epidemic at its center of origin in 
Africa; 
  There was a similarly inadequate mobilization in the case of BSE.  In 
both cases,  the infrastructure was too vulnerable to interests within the 
infrastructure that wished to play down the significance of what was 
being observed; 
  In contrast, the Swine Flu experience, shows an appropriate early 
identification and mobilization; however, there was a subsequent failure 
in adaptation as mass immunization was not  put on hold pending more 
definitive evidence that a pandemic was imminent.  This case shows 
that mobilization, once started, is difficult to stop and it provides  39
another example of how efforts at mitigation may cause harm rather 
than help; 
  Finally the recent experience with SARS provides an example where, 
with some difficulties, a global response was achieved and the 
combination of surveillance and travel restrictions appeared to halt the 
development of an epidemic. 
 
6.1.4 The threat of a substantial change in thermohaline circulation. 
Climate across continents is very strongly influenced by large scale ocean 
circulation patterns.  These result from differences in water density from the 
combination of differences in temperature and in salinity (hence the name 
thermohaline). Global warming will alter the circulation by changing the influx 
of fresh water in arctic regions; a serious question is what is the likelihood of a 
substantial change in circulation and what would be the magnitude of the 
consequences.  In many respects the problem is analogous to West Antarctic ice 
sheet collapse.  Drastic changes have occurred in previous eras so the 
possibility cannot be ruled out; the basic mechanisms for change are understood 
(just as for ice sheet movement); however, the nature of triggers and other key 
non-linear responses are not well known, and predictions are not feasible; the 
best estimates are that drastic change in the next century are unlikely, but small 
but significant probabilities cannot be ruled out. Two differences in the analysis 
are, however, significant: 1) unlike a description of West Antarctic ice sheet  40
collapse, thermohaline circulation is already built (with varying levels of detail) 
into the global circulation models that are used for assessing global climate 
change; and 2) the possible link between global warming and the threat of 
significant changes in circulation is clear. The current state of assessment of 
this threat sheds light on climate change assessment generally (Alley, Marotzke, 
Nordhaus, Overpeck, Peteet, Pielke Jr, Pierrehumbert, Rhines, Stocker, Talley and Wallace, 
2003) (Steffen et al., 2004).  
 
  Most current assessment effort is directed toward the most likely 
possibilities; these may not be the most important from a risk 
perspective; 
  There has been little study and little is known about the magnitude of 
the consequences for a substantial change in thermohaline circulation 
beyond the observation that severe regional disruption would be 
expected (Link and Tol, 2004, are an exception, (Link and Tol, 2004)); 
  There has also been very little study of human adaptation to such a 
change, or of the opportunities to improve adaptive capability; 
  For modeling to meet this broader challenge more detail on a range of 
natural processes in addition to anthropogenic forcing will probably be 
required (Alley, Marotzke, Nordhaus, Overpeck, Peteet, Pielke Jr, Pierrehumbert, 
Rhines, Stocker, Talley and Wallace, 2003).  
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7. Implications for risk management  
Given the nature of the risk problem presented by the potential collapse of the 
West Antarctic ice sheet and a concomitant large sea level rise over the next 
century or two, substantial implications exist for both the continuing assessment 
of these risks and uncertainties and for the evolution of an appropriate 
international management regime. It is not the task of this review paper to 
design either an ongoing assessment process or a robust future management 
regime, but it may be useful to explore the implications that we see for each 
stemming from our review. 
 
While it is natural to associate the threat of West Antarctic ice sheet collapse 
with the general threat of global warming, the science presently available does 
not show clear links while feedback mechanisms are complex and poorly 
understood. Indeed there is great uncertainty about the workings of all 
identified or proposed mechanisms for collapse, and great uncertainty about the 
implications, if any, of a rise in global temperature for these mechanisms. So 
one could ask whether the threat of West Antarctic ice sheet collapse is most 
appropriately treated as a separate hazard, or whether it should be considered in 
the context of greenhouse gas-induced climate change. Here we argue that there 
are a number of reasons why for the foreseeable time West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse is best considered in the context of GHG threats of climate change, 
specifically:  42
 
  there is a large existing assessment apparatus concerned with 
GHG-induced climate change that is acquiring information and 
making assessments that bear on the West Antarctic ice sheet 
issue; 
  many data about the West Antarctic ice sheet are relevant to 
GHG-induced climate change; 
  the link may be important and GHG control is thus a relevant 
mitigation approach; 
  vulnerability to sea-level rise is a major concern even for the 
lower but still potentially severe rise in the sea level envisioned 
in GHG climate change studies (as in the IPCC) (see more 
particularily the potential sea level rise contribution from 
Greenland under climate warming, summarized in Appendix 1); 
  most important, if there weren￿t a direct connection, there is 
considerable synergy in developing assessment capability and in 
many mitigation and adaptation initiatives. 
 
Furthermore a risk estimate based on the minimal assumption that the start of a 
West Antarctic ice sheet collapse is a random event whose frequency can be 
roughly estimated from the time since the last such event (Bentley) gives a 
probability of roughly .1% for the initiation of collapse in the next century. 
Turning to the uncertainty that surround historical observations, the fact that  43
there is a plausible case that  a West Antarctic ice sheet collapse has occurred in 
the past (as we note in our above discussion on abrupt change) means that we 
should not encourage a scientific regime in which the debate centers on whether 
or not a West Antarctic ice sheet collapse is impossible. Furthermore the 
uniform risk estimate by Bentley of .1% in the next century or two is very high 
for any event with such severe and widespread consequences. It is instructive, 
for example, that a 10
-5 to 10
-6 likelihood of a core melt per reactor year in a 
nuclear plant is widely considered to be at the threshold of acceptability. The 
consequences of such events pale in comparison with those presented by a large 
future sea-level rise. Consequently, the most important estimates will be 
conditional on our knowledge of present circumstances and will involve 
questions as to how predictable significant changes in the ice sheet are and how 
rapidly such changes can occur. Satisfactory estimates of this sort can be 
created only with considerable mechanistic understanding which does not now 
exist nor is it likely to in the near future. 
 
The IPCC predictions for GHG-induced climate change are helpful in that they 
set a scale for thinking about both the likelihood of West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse and the magnitude of sea level rise. The predicted range is almost a 
meter (.09-.88m). One meter is a very serious rise in sea level by itself, 
approaching the levels discussed in connection with West Antarctic ice sheet 
melting (which woul be added). If the range presented were a conventional 95% 
confidence interval, the implied probability for a sea level rise exceeding close  44
to a meter would be 2.5%, which is very large for such a serious threat, and the 
failure to consider abrupt changes more fully in the scenarios may suggest that 
this figure may be conservative.  Even if the range presented were a 99% 
confidence interval, the implied probability would be .5% and that is still very 
large. Without new mechanistic information, there is no adequate basis for 
extrapolating the IPCC probability range to estimates of the likelihood of even 
greater sea level rise. Even a 0.1% probability for a large sea level rise between 
now and 2100, a 10
-3 likelihood, should be considered extremely high when 
considering the even more severe threats of a sea level rise of 2 to 5 meters. 
These observations also underscore again that it is useful to treat the threat of 
West Antarctic ice sheet collapse in the context of other concerns about GHG-
induced climate change. 
 
Nonetheless, there are useful things to be undertaken in the ongoing assessment 
of sea-level rise risks. There is a considerable body of risk information much of 
which is still quite new and relevant to interpretation. Furthermore, it is very 
likely, indeed probably certain, that important new information￿including 
some surprises￿will emerge. The most useful information on forcing functions 
will be found in addressing questions that link mitigation possibilities to 
mechanistic information. One such example is that as long as there is any 
potential link between GHG-induced warming and West Antarctic ice sheet 
collapse, the seriousness of that threat should be a strong incentive to 
developing capabilities for reducing GHG emissions. Another example is that  45
further analysis of vulnerabilities may indicate that the most relevant threat 
indicator is the rate of sea level rise rather than the total rise (or vice versa). 
Such a finding could help focus the search for signals as we gain greater 
mechanistic understanding. Some of these linkages deserve more attention￿for 
instance is it worth inquiring as to whether a global rise in temperature might 
increase the rate of sea level rise from West Antarctic ice sheet disintegration, 
even it were not the initial trigger of collapse? And GHG climate-induced 
changes in storm severity and frequency could have implications for sea level 
rise mitigation efforts and for developing strategies for coping and adaptation. 
 
Finally, the large uncertainties surrounding a potentially large sea-level rise 
make clear that assessments must give much greater attention to places, 
ecosystems, and peoples who are at disproportionately high risk. Such 
assessments will need to take account of scale differences and interactions, the 
interaction of sea-level rise with other stresses from other sources, and the 
differential sensitivity of impacted areas and peoples. Such assessments will 
need to be much more bottom-up in approach than the IPCC assessments 
conducted thus far. They will also need to be much more collaborative in nature 
with the people at-risk in these areas so as to draw upon both expert and local 
knowledge and to identify viable strategies for reducing vulnerabilities and 
enlarging adaptive capacities and resources. In short, the assessment process 
needs to become much more balanced in its attention to mitigation and  46
vulnerability reduction, and more collaborative in how these assessments are 
conducted. 
 
Turning to implications for management strategies and initiatives, the large 
uncertainties and the nature of the sea-level risk problem suggest that 
 
  surprises are inevitable and often cannot be predicted or 
anticipated; 
  management should start with what is already know, 
acknowledge openly the major scientific uncertainties, and 
address uncertainties about human behavior that affect the risks; 
  management institutional systems must be highly flexible, 
possess a strong capability to respond rapidly to surprises, and 
view management as a continuing process of experiments and 
mid-course corrections; 
  the most valuable management resource will be a high capability 
to learn￿to seek out new data and interpretations, to challenge 
conventional wisdoms, and to learn from errors and false starts. 
 
We go on to consider some of the attributes, or considerations, for management 
systems and strategy.  
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The first management necessity is high flexibility and a potential for ongoing 
rethinking and shifts in strategy. Given the large uncertainties surrounding the 
causes and consequences of sea-level rise, and the strong limitations to 
anticipatory risk assessment, societal response to sea-level rise will not be a 
one-time ￿fix,￿ but a series of coping initiatives and adaptations unfolding over 
time. Whether the focus should be on mitigation or adaptation will also almost 
certainly also be a changing story over time. Surprises and major departures in 
understanding will surely occur and will demand a rapid response capability. 
This suggests that the preferred management approach should be what is 
usually described as adaptive management (Hollings, 1978) (Walters, 1986) (Lee, 
1993). 
 
Central to such a management approach is a high capability for social learning 
(Berkes et al., 1998). New information and assessments, and undoubtedly new 
uncertainties, will continue to appear. A high capability to learn will involve an 
openness to new problem framings and novel interpretations of the dynamics of 
ice sheet collapse. Open acknowledgment of uncertainties in the changing 
knowledge base will be important. Divergent views will need to be supported 
and encouraged within the management structures, as well as, through 
continuing interaction with critics and minority views outside the management 
institutions. Meanwhile, the management process will need to be construed as 
an interactive one, with continuing reassessment and mid-course correction. In 
essence, it needs to be inductive in approach. Indeed, management will need to  48
be structured as an experimental process in which some number of assessments 
yield negative results and some interventions are expected to be less than 
optimal over time or even fail. 
 
A natural conceptual approach in developing an appropriate management 
strategy is to imagine confronting the strategy with a series of events ￿ a 
scenario ￿ that represents a possible evolution of the risk of concern.  In so 
doing, one tests (hypothetically) whether the strategy incorporates the needed 
capabilities and can coordinate their use. For highly uncertain risks, we don￿t 
know what scenario to expect, or even what scenario would represent the 
greatest risk, and, as described above, we would hope to develop a management 
strategy that would address a broad range of possibilities; we thus should 
confront each strategy with a range of scenarios. Furthermore, as we discussed 
previously, there is uncertainty in several critical dimensions: how large the sea 
level rise will be; how rapidly it will occur; when it will begin; how much 
fluctuation and change there will be in the rate of rise; and how predictable the 
rise will appear as it is occurring.  We thus will want a portfolio of scenarios 
that 1) are reasonably representative across these five dimensions; 2) include 
the range of possibilities of most concern from our assessment of risks; 3) 
provide a suitable variety of challenges to proposed management structures. 
With such a portfolio one can test (conceptually) what capabilities are needed 
and what aspects of design must be in place for effective use across the 
portfolio.  Comparisons along various dimensions may be particularly  49
informative:  we could hope to assess how sensitive management success is 
likely to be to the rapidity of sea level rise, or to the quality of predictions; and 
we might be able to draw inferences about the resilience of particular 
management approaches under a variety of conditions, or about vulnerabilities 
related to time of response.   
 
Given the limitations to anticipatory risk assessment and to interpreting 
mechanisms and their interactions involved in potential ice sheet collapse, 
monitoring will need to occupy a central place in risk and uncertainty 
interpretation. Given the gains in knowledge associated with new 
measurements and data gathering, noted above over the past several years, 
expanded monitoring efforts to track changes in ice sheet dynamics, changes in 
mechanisms, and associated sea-level risk are a needed part of an adaptive 
management approach. Helpful in these efforts will be the identification of 
signals that may be linked to possible management initiatives and interventions 
and tracking trends in forcing functions and changes in disintegration 
mechanisms. 
 
Since adaptive management is essential experimental, social trust is an 
important ingredient. Open acknowledgement of rethinking, evolving 
knowledge, and shifts in management strategies requires confidence in the 
institutions and peoples charged with management responsibility. This will 
place a substantial burden on management institutions for an uncompromised  50
commitment to their mission to protect the global environment and people and 
a need for these institutions to be viewed as scientifically competent, fair and 
just in decisions, collaborative in assessment activities and open and 
accountable to those they serve. Missteps that lead to a loss in trust will likely 
prove difficult to correct and recover from, at least in the short term (Slovic, 
2000). 
 
Finally, the combination of potentially catastrophic consequences the 
irreversibility of changes, and poorly understood probabilities suggest that 
precaution should be an important ethical element in management strategy. Sea 
level rise, as we have noted above, is linked to other climate change risks so 
that appropriate precautionary measures may realize a spectrum of protection 
benefits. Just as assessment will involve an evolution of knowledge and 
understanding, so management strategies must range across different 
combinations of mitigation and adaptation options, taking account of the place-
based nature of vulnerabilities and impacts. So effective management regimes 
and institutions will also need to be grown incrementally, and experimentally, 
particularly seeking win-win situations where they can be identified. 
 
Four management arenas merit particular attention in light of this discussion of 
how to make management more effective and adaptive.  These are 1) 
developing practical  and implementable capabilities for limiting the levels of 
GHGs in the atmosphere, 2) developing monitoring and analytic capabilities  51
that can provide ongoing assessments of knowledge about the West Antarctic 
ice sheet threat, linkages to  GHG climate issues, opportunities and 
effectiveness of mitigation approaches, and identification of vulnerabilities, 3)  
the development of capabilities for directly responding to sea level rise in 
diverse localities, 4) the achievement of reductions in vulnerability to sea level 
rise. In each arena, there are key questions which should be addressed in a 
context of scenario portfolios. 
 
For instance a key uncertainty regarding GHG reductions is just how effective 
approaches to make substantial reductions would be. While the technological 
and economic possibilities for reductions are reasonably familiar, there is very 
little practical experience with implementing control measures on the scale that 
would be required to have a significant impact on atmospheric levels of GHGs. 
Thus present day efforts to implement limits on GHG emissions can best be 
regarded as steps to develop capabilities that can be viewed as future 
management options when the threat of GHG induced climate change becomes 
better understood.   The possibility of very severe effects, such as West 
Antarctic ice sheet collapse,  implies that it is late rather than early to begin 
such capability development. 
 
Further key questions linked to the remaining management arenas include: 
 
•  From an adaptive management perspective, a key question  52
within threat surveillance and evaluation (likelihood and 
magnitude of West Antarctic ice sheet melting and sea level 
rise), is whether signals can be identified that will provide 
warning of impending rises, and which will offer some promise 
of predicting rates of rise; 
•  One key question linked to direct mitigation capabilities is under 
what circumstances (rate of rise, storm frequency)  local 
mitigative and adaptive capabilities will be overwhelmed; 
•  Another key question in this arena is what are the possibilities 
for mitigation efforts to cause harm rather than help; 
•  In the indirect mitigation arena, key questions are what are the 
important determinants of vulnerability to sea level rise, and, 
based on those determinants what are effective measures to 
reduce vulnerability. 
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Appendix 1: Greenland ice sheet and sea level rise 
 
IPCC notes 2.7 
oC (for present ice-sheet topography and slightly warmer for a 
retreating ice sheet at higher latitude) as the annual average warming over the 
Greenland ice sheet at which ablation will have increased to equal accumulation 
(Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 
2001 p. 677).  When the offsetting effect between ablation and accumulation 
can no longer progress, i.e. when the mass balance becomes negative,  the ice 
sheet will start to make a positive contribution to sea level rise. Given the 
amplification of warming at high latitudes, this magnitude of warming can be 
reached through several greenhouse gas concentration increases.  
 
IPCC projects for nearly all combinations of AOGCMs and SRES scenarios 
that the temperature increase over Greenland by 2100 will be more than 2.7 
oC, 
with a maximum of 9 
oC (Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and 
Woodworth, 2001 p. 678). Running combinations of seven climate models and five 
stabilization levels, ranging from 450 p.p.m. to 1000 p.p.m., Gregory et al. find 
that 34 of these combinations pass through the 2.7 
oC warming  by 2350 if 
considering annual average warming. Looking at summer warming (which is 
more relevant since no melting takes place in winter) and allowing for a +
 or -
0.5 
oC uncertainty in the warming threshold, 24 out of 35 combinations pass 
through 2.7 
oC by 2350. Several simulations pass the threshold by 2100 (Gregory  54
et al., 2004 p. 616). Uncertainties  in the warming threshold for positive sea level 
rise contribution come from uncertainties in precipitation changes, in 
calculations of melting, in the geographical distribution of warming and in the 
effects of ice-sheet dynamics (Gregory, Huybrechts and Raper, 2004).  
 
Table 2: Responses of the Greenland ice sheet to increased CO2 ,  is an 
overview of some estimates that have been made of Greenland contributions to 
sea level rise in response to climate change: 
 
Table 2 to follow. 
 
From this review, the upper estimates of Greenland ice sheet contribution to  
sea level rise in the 21
st and 22
nd centuries are 41.1cm in the period 1990-2130 
(Huybrechts and De Wolde, 1999 p.2174) and 40 cm in the period 2000-2122 (Greve, 
2000 p.294). The first estimate is based on a 8 x CO2 concentration stabilising at 
2130 and a +7.9 
oC mean annual temperature increase over Greenland (also 
stabilising at 2130). The second estimate is based on a +12 
oC mean annual air 
temperature increase over Greenland occurring over the present millenium.  For 
a more extended time period, 1990-2500, the upper estimate is 360 cm in the 
period 1990-2500 for a +8.4 
oC near annual temperature increase over 
Greenland due to a 8 x CO2   concentration increase. Alternatively, the upper 
estimate could be cited as 582 cm here, if considering the upper estimate of the 
study, as opposed to its best estimate (Parizek and Alley, 2004 p. 1023).  55
 
For a 2 x CO2  the estimates of Greenland contribution to sea level rise in this 
review range from negligible in 1990-2060 (Bugnion and Stone, 2002 p. 100), 
through -0.5-1.7cm in 1990-2100 (Bugnion and Stone, 2002 p. 103) and   6.8cm  in 
the period 1990-2130 (Huybrechts and De Wolde, 1999 p. 2174), to 6+ (0.6-6.5)cm  in 
the period 1990-2100 (Parizek and Alley, 2004 p.1024).  The differences are of a 
small absolute magnitude in the century time scale, but where simulations have 
also been done for several centuries into the future the absolute differences 
between the estimates increase.  Hence, Parizek et al. report an increase of 15-
108cm, with a best estimate of 15 cm, over the estimate of 40cm given by 
Huybrechts et al.  for the period 1990-2500. Buignon et al. end simulations in 
2100.  
   
The increse in melt compared to previous estimates which Parizek and Alley 
report, is due to a description of the melting process which includes surface-
meltwater lubrication of ice flow. They conclude that "this recently discovered 
physical connetion between ice-sheet flow and above-freezinf surface 
temperatures should not be ignored when assessing the global impact of climate 
change"(Parizek and Alley, 2004 p. 1025). Research is needed to reduce local and 
regional uncertainties in the quantification of the speed-up mechanism. The 
authors believe that observations will help determine if local observations that 
have been made also apply to the equilibrium and /or ablations zones across the 
Greenland ice sheet (Parizek and Alley, 2004).  56
 
An almost complete disintegration of the ice sheet, resulting in almost a  7m sea 
level rise, is thought to be possible within the millenium with  a +12 
oC mean 
annual air temperature increase over Greenland (also occurring over the 
millenium) (Greve, 2000 p. 289).   An interesting new result is that the complete 
melt of the Greenland ice sheet may be irreversible. Using the HadCM3 
AOGCM model, the regional and global climate is simulated for the case where 
the Greenland ice sheet is removed and greenhouse gas concentrations are at 
preindustrial levels. Results show that in the long-term average there is no snow 
accumulation over Greenland (Tonazzio et al., 2004). However, the question 
remains "whether after the removal of the ice sheet the high ground in the 
southeast could support an ice cap, which might then begin a dynamic regrowth 
of an ice sheet over more of the Greenland landmass. This question needs to be 
answered with a dynamic ice sheet model " (Tonazzio, Gregory and Huybrechts, 2004 
p.21). 
 
In contrast to the WAIS, the GIS may have fewer ways to respond to climate 
change that involve thresholds and qualitative changes in the behaviour of the 
ice sheet. According to Greve, the process that may operate in Greenland is 
creep instability as increasing temperatures reduce ice viscosity. (Greve, 2000) 
However, as suggested above, the response time of the GIS to climate change 
may be faster than previously thought -  the timescale of response of summer  57
surface melt to climate change may be one of days to months as opposed to 
centuries to millennia (Parizek and Alley, 2004 p. 1014). 
 
The Greenland ice sheet can thus make considerable contribution to sea level 
rise this century. Importantly, over the longer time scale of millenia, the sea 
level rise resulting from the melt of  Greenland would exceed that of the 
collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet in absolute magnitude. It should also be 
recalled that thermal expansion eventually reaches much higher levels than at 
the time of stabilisation of CO2 concentration. The IPCC writes: "On account of 
the time-scale, the thermal expansion in the 2x CO2 experiments after 500 years 
of constant CO2 is 4 to 9 times higher than at the time when the concentration 
stabilises. Even by this time, it may only have reached half its eventual level, 
which models suggest may lie within a range of 0.5 to 2.0 m for 2x CO2 and 1 
to 4 m for 4x CO2. For the first 1,000 years, the 4x CO2 models give 1 to 3 m." 
(Church, Gregory, Huybrechts, Kuhn, Lambeck, Nhuan, Qin and Woodworth, 2001 p. 677) As 
already mentioned, for  considerable CO2 increases, simple melt of the WAIS is 
also to be considered.    58
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Table 1: Estimates of sea level rise due to disintegration of the West Antarctic ice 
sheet 
If a box is left blank the author did not comment that aspect. 
 
                                                 
1 "Inherent glacial instability leading to disintegration of an ice sheet is probably related in every way to the formation of subglacial 
water thick enough to effectively decouple the ice sheet from its bed. In the West Antarctic ice sheet, the subglacial water layer can be 
either injected under the ice sheet or produced by basal heating." pp. 508-509.   
2  
In the model ice-stream acceleration is consistent with ice-shelf weakening. ( There is also a negative feedback of increased ice 
discharge on ice-shelf  thinning.) 
3 24 cm as best estimate (ice shelf basal melting rates increasing to maximum 1m per year); 13-239 cm with ice shelf basal melting 
rates increasing to maximum 1m per year; 62-295 cm with ice shelf basal melting rates increasing to  maximum 3 m per year. 
Source  Forcing on 
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1 Climate forcing by sea-level (effects grounding lines) and local surface temperature (effects accumulation). 
2 "Hypotheses to account for the observed ice-stream changes include changes in the generation and transport of water and basal 
debris, and variations in ice strength." p. 962 
3
Ice streams and their slippery beds incorporated in model. Based on MacAyeal 1992 study. 
Unsynchronised collapse occurring once every glacial cycle. 
4 Bentley writes: "I estimate the chance of that to be on the order of one in a thousand. Obviously, this is not a number to be taken  
literally: nevertheless, I believe it puts the threat of rapid sea-level rise from a WAIS collapse in a realistic perspective."  p. 161 
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Table 2: Responses of the Greenland ice sheet to increased CO2 





Rate of sea level rise 
2 x CO2 concentration, 1990 -
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+2.9 
oC mean annual temperature 
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elevation-based 
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2xCO2 concentration (345-690 
p.p.m.v) by 2100.  
  +0.6-1.2mm/yr   
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presently) 
 
                                                 
1 Changes in mass balance translated into changes in sea level assuming that changes in runoff and accumulation proceed linearly in 
the period 1990-2060.  67
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1 about 6 cm is cited as the present best estimate (from Church et al. IPCC 2001) of Greenland contribution to sea level rise if 
assuming  approximately 2.5 degree increase in the global mean surface temperature by 2100. Numbers in parentheses are the ranges 
of additional rises using flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production and assuming 2 x CO2,  4 x CO2 ,8 x CO2 B. R. 
Parizek, R. B. Alley: 2004, Implications of Increased Greenland Surface Melt Under Global-Warming 
Scenarios: ice-sheet simulations’, Quaternary Science Reviews 23(9-10), 1013-1027.. 
2 about 6 cm is cited as the present best estimate (from Church et al. IPCC 2001) of Greenland contribution to sea level rise if 
assuming  approximately 2.5 degree increase in the global mean surface temperature by 2100. Numbers in parentheses are the ranges 
of additional rises using flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production and assuming 2 x CO2,  4 x CO2 ,8 x CO2 Ibid.. 
3 about 6 cm is cited as the present best estimate (from Church et al. IPCC 2001) of Greenland contribution to sea level rise if 
assuming  approximately 2.5 degree increase in the global mean surface temperature by 2100. Numbers in parentheses are the ranges 
of additional rises using flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production and assuming 2 x CO2,  4 x CO2 ,8 x CO2 Ibid.. 
4 40 cm is the estimate the authors take  from Huybrechts and de Wolde 1999 (Huybrechts, P., de Wolde, J, 1999. The Dynamic 
response of the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets to Multiple-Century Climatic Warming. Journal of Climate 12: 2169-2188), an 
estimate which is computed  using a model without flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production. 15-108 cm is the range 
of additional sea level rise using the model with flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production, with 15 cm considered the 
best estimate by the authors Ibid.. 55cm is 40cm plus the best estimate.  
5 150 cm is the estimate the authors take  from Huybrechts and de Wolde, an estimate which is computed  using a model without flow 
enhancement linked to surface meltwater production. 15-154 cm is the range of additional sea level rise using the model with flow 
enhancement linked to surface meltwater production, with 22cm considered the best estimate by the authors Ibid.. 172cm is 150cm 
plus the best estimate. 
6 320 cm is the estimate the authors take from Huybrechts and de Wolde  1999, an estimate which is computed with a model without 
flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production. 31-262 cm is the range of additional sea level rise using the model with 
flow enhancement linked to surface meltwater production, with 40 cm considered the best estimate by the authors Ibid.. 360 cm is 
320 cm plus the best estimate.  68
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